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Abstraction—Solving free riding and selecting a reliable 
service provider in P2P networks has been separately 
investigated in last few years. Using trust has shown to 
be one of the best ways of solving these problems. But 
using this approach to simultaneously deal with both 
problems makes it impossible for newcomers to join the 
network and the expansion of network is prevented. In 
this paper we used the game theory to model the 
behavior of peers and developed a mechanism in which 
free riding and providing bad service are dominated 
strategies for peers. At the same time newcomers can 
participate and are encouraged to be active in the 
network. The proposed model has been simulated and 
the results showed that the trust value of free riders and 
bad service providers converge to a finite value and 
trust of peers who provide good service is monotonically 
increased despite the time they join the network. 
 
Keywords cold start, peer-to-peer networks, free riding, 
server selection, trust 
I.   Introduction 
Voluntary sharing of resources and lack of central 
control that are two of the most paramount 
characteristics of peer-to-peer networks, have created 
substantial problems in development of networks 
with such architecture.  
Voluntary sharing of resources are misused by free 
riders, those peers who do not share their resources 
with the other peers while using the others resources. 
In addition, as a result of the lack of central control, 
peers cannot trust the services they are going to 
receive from an unknown server (another peer) and 
face challenges in selecting a dependable server. 
Using “trust” is one of the successful methods that 
have been utilized to address the two aforementioned 
problems [10-14] [16-19]. But one of the problems 
that trust-based systems encounter is how to treat the 
newcomers (those peers who have just connected to 
the network). The solutions that have been provided 
so far, tackle either the problem of server selection or 
that of confronting free riders, and as a result of their 
limited approach, the cold start problem does not 
evince seriously. As will be described in sections 2 
and 3, if trust is used in its traditional way to 
simultaneously confront the free riders and select 
dependable servers, the clod start problem makes it 
very difficult (if not impossible) for the newcomers 
to join the network. 
Our effort in this paper is to propose a trust-based 
method for a peer-to-peer file sharing network, to 
recognize free riders and to select a dependable 
server, while newcomers can conveniently join the 
network. To achieve this goal we have changed the 
definition of a “free rider”. In our definition, any peer 
who is only willing to provide services to the others 
is no longer a free rider even if others do not select 
him as a service provider. On the other hand, 
selection of a dependable server is not always done 
based upon trust. Game theory has been utilized to 
prove if the rate of increasing and decreasing of trust 
is selected properly then “free riding” and “bad 
service” will become dominated strategies. The 
discussion presented at section 4 shows the feasibility 
of joining newcomers to this network. The simulation 
results provided afterwards proves the practical 
efficiency of this solution. 
The paper structure is as follows: Section 2 is 
dedicated to reviewing the solutions provided in the 
fields of recognizing free riders, selecting servers and 
dealing with newcomers. Section 3 considers the cold 
start problem in more details. Section 4 presents the 
recommended solution, which will be supported with 
the simulation results in section 5, followed by 
section 6 as conclusion. 
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II.    Literature Review  
A. Free Riders 
One of the major problems in front of peer-to-
peer networks is how to recognize and confront free 
riders. This problem had not been considered in 
designing the protocols of the primary networks such 
as Napster and Gnutella [1]. Utilizing the game 
theory that models peers as rational players who are 
after increasing their own profit, it has been shown 
that free riding is the dominant strategy for all users 
[2]. The outcomes of these models conform to the 
experiments done on the real networks such as 
Gnutella and BitTorrent [3]. As per [4], more than 
70% of users in Gnutella networks do not share any 
files and [5] found out that this statistics rose to 85% 
in 2005. Another research on eDonkey networks 
found the same results [6]. 
Since in peer-to-peer networks, the individual 
interests are, in many circumstances, in contradiction 
with the group’s common welfare, the recent 
approach, taken by the researchers in modeling peer-
to-peer networks is to consider users as selfish 
players who are after increasing their own profit [7]. 
Therefore the focus in recent works is on designing 
incentives for the users to encourage them to share 
their resources. 
There are three main types of incentives: 
o The willingness of users to share. In this 
type sheer sharing of resources is rewarding 
to the user. [8] Considered this method and 
showed that if the willingness of users to 
share, which is called the generosity level, is 
higher than a specific value, there is no need 
to confront free-riders. 
o The next method is direct paying the cost of 
resources with some kind of electronic 
money. Usefulness of this method in 
Napster network has been examined in [9] 
with the aid of game theory. The main issue 
with this method is the need for a 
trustworthy reference to issue the money and 
do the accounting. The existence of such an 
entity is considered as given in all 
researches. 
o The third method which is more realistic and 
consequently more successful of the others 
is retaliation. In this method each user keeps 
a record of the activities of the other users 
and whenever it receives a request, decides 
whether or not to consent, based on the 
record of the requester in sharing its 
resources. Depending on the information 
kept at the record, this method falls into two 
categories of direct and indirect retaliation. 
In direct retaliation each user keeps only a 
record of its own interactions and decides 
accordingly. In large networks, the 
interaction between two specific users is 
rarely repeated and therefore in most cases 
the two interacting users have no record 
from each other. As a result the indirect 
retaliation method has been more widely 
noticed. The methods that are designed 
based on indirect retaliation utilize the trust 
concept to acquire the record of users. The 
difference among these methods is in the 
way they calculate and manage the trust 
[10]-[14]. 
B. Dealing with Newcomers and the Whitewashing 
Problem 
Dealing with newcomers is one of the issues that 
is closely related to confronting the free riders. By 
simple definition, a user who does not have a record 
of sharing her resources is a free rider. According to 
this definition all newcomers fall into free riders 
category. Another factor that increases the 
complexity of this problem is the existence of 
whitewashers; those free riders who leave the 
network and rejoin with a new identity in order to 
clear their trust value and avoid penalties. The 
inability of differentiation between the newcomers 
and the whitewashers is a common weakness of all 
reputation based trust systems [8], and the reason is 
that new identities to join peer-to-peer networks are 
free [8].  
Assigning identities by a trustworthy source can 
be used as a solution to the whitewashing 
phenomena. Two main approaches are taken if there 
is no such a source. In the first method, all 
newcomers are provided with some services for a 
specific period, but if no service is provided by the 
newcomer during this period, she will be listed as a 
free rider. The main deficiency of this method is that 
free riders can use the whitewashing trick as soon as 
they are recognized. In the second method, the 
minimum level of trust is assigned to all newcomers, 
therefore each newcomer has to share her resources 
to increase her trust and become eligible for receiving 
services. In this way the cost of whitewashing will be 
more than sharing the resources and the tendency of 
users to whitewashing will decline [8]. 
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C. Server Selection 
Since in peer-to-peer networks there are often 
more than one server to answer a request, there 
should be a selection mechanism to choose among 
servers. There are many factors that add into the 
importance of a selection mechanism. Apart from the 
quality of service, a server can provide wrong or 
dangerous information such as virus affected files. 
Another issue that should be taken into account is 
that a lot of peers leave the network before 
completing a file sharing process or upload files with 
a very low bandwidth.  
A successful method to avoid malicious servers is 
the reputation based trust. In this method a score is 
credited to each server based on its past activities and 
this score is used in selecting servers [15].  
A number of methods have been designed to 
credit the trust scores and to store and retrieve the 
scores. Most of these methods try to address three 
problems that are the main concerns in trust 
management [16]-[19]: 
o Overhead: The system should impose the 
least amount of overhead to the network in 
terms of bandwidth and processing 
resources. 
o Collusion: There should not be possible to 
act in collusion to increase the reputation 
scores of each others. 
o Distribution: System should not need any 
kind of centralism. 
  
To solve these problems all methods utilize one of 
these two schemes: 
o Selecting a server which has the highest 
reputation score. Or 
o Considering all servers as candidates 
providing that their score is higher than a 
minimum. 
 
Here as in confronting free riders, whitewashing 
is a problem. The solution that is recommended is to 
assign the minimum trust score to the newcomers. 
But this solution in turn, creates the “cold start” 
problem which is described in the following section. 
III.   Cold Start 
Let’s consider a peer to peer file sharing network, 
in which trust is used not only to select the server but 
also to confront free riders. In other words when user 
A sends a request and user B replies it, user A first 
checks the trust of user B as a criteria to accept or to 
reject her as a server and in case user B is accepted, 
then user B checks the trust of user A before 
providing her with the requested file to make sure she 
is not a free rider. Also to avoid whitewashing 
problem, the minimum score is assigned to all 
newcomers as described earlier. 
Let’s also assume this network has been active for 
a relatively long period and a number of users have 
been able to gain a high trust value. Now if a 
newcomer joins the system she will be assigned the 
minimum trust. As a result no user is interested in 
receiving a file from her unless she is the only node 
who acquires that specific file (which is a very 
unlikely scenario in large networks). Therefore this 
newcomer has no chance in increasing her trust from 
the minimum value to distinguish herself from free 
riders. Since this minimum score is common between 
newcomers and free riders, her request for files will 
also be rejected by all servers, meaning the 
interaction between this newcomer and the other 
peers of the network will reach a deadlock. 
IV.  Solution 
As we saw in section 3, the main barrier in front 
of newcomers to a peer-to-peer network is that they 
are not being differentiated with free riders. The 
current definition of free riders in peer-to-peer 
networks which recognizes a free rider as a user who 
does not provide services, does not differentiate 
between users who are not willing to provide any 
service and those who are, but are not requested to. 
Here we suggest a new definition for free riders. 
Definition 4.1: Free rider is a peer who is not willing 
to provide services to the others.  
This definition implies that the mere willingness 
to provide services should increase the reputation of 
the peer. 
To implement this new definition we need to 
modify the reputation scoring method. In current 
networks the logic behind scoring (regardless of the 
implementation method) is that a peer makes a 
request for service and waits for reply from a number 
of peers. Then she will select one of them (based on 
their trust); receives service from her; increases the 
server’s trust and ignores the other volunteers. 
To implement the new definition we try to 
increase the trust of all users who volunteer to 
service, consequently a newcomer who is willing to 
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provide service will not fall into the free riders 
category. 
A new problem that arises here is how to 
recognize fake volunteers? Since the probability of 
being selected as the server is very low for the peers 
with low trust, there will be such peers who do not 
posses the requested resources but claim 
preparedness to provide service merely to increase 
their trust. 
To resolve this problem, we can annul the 
presumption behind this behavior (the low 
probability of selection of a user with low trust as a 
server). In other words, no peer should be able to 
predict his chance for being selected as a server. 
Then a big penalty should be considered for any 
selected volunteer who cannot provide the requested 
service. 
We utilize the game theory to quantify the credit 
and penalty values. The set of players is consists of 
j+1 players. Players 1 is the peer who request a file 
and players 2 to j+1 are those peers who receive the 
request. You should notice that players 2 to j+1 are 
not the ultimate service provider. They are peers that 
answered to the request of player 1. Player 1 then 
chooses one of them and that player becomes the 
service provider. So the set of players is as follow: 
 
I = {1, 2,…, j+1}    (1) 
 
The value of j is different in each round of game. 
The value of  j is known to the player 1, but not to the 
other players. We use the following notations to 
specify a player or set of players: 
• Player -1 = all players except player 1 
• Player i = the player whom is chosen by          
player 1. 2 ൑ i ൑ j+1. 
• Player –i = all the players except the one 
that player 1 choose. 2 ൑ i ൑ j+1. 
The set of pure strategies for player 1 is the ways 
of choosing a player i, 2 ൑ i ൑ j+1, she can choose 
according to the trust of players or choose randomly. 
 For the player -1 pure strategy set is consists of how 
she responds to the request, that could be one of two 
choices, telling the truth (answer the query just if has 
the file), or lying (fake answer to all requests). And 
the quality of service that provide to player 1, if she 
is chosen by player 1. Notice that when player -1 is 
lied the quality of service is automatically bad, 
because there is no service. Here by quality of service 
we means that player 1 complete the file transfer 
successfully. So there is no way for player 1 to find 
out whether player -1 lied about having a particular 
file or just has a bad quality of service, for example 
low bandwidth, wrong file or lack of availability. 
According to the above discussion, we set the pure 
strategies of player -1 to “telling the truth” and 
“lying”. 
 
S1 = {BT, R} X {2, …. , j+1}  
S2 = S3 = …. = Sj+1 = {T, L}        
BR= “choosing by trust”, R = “choosing randomly”, 
T = “telling the truth”, L = “lying”  
             (2)  
     
To define the utility function for player 1, let’s 
consider having a file has a profit of N units and 
doing the transaction cost him –M units. It’s obvious 
that N > M because otherwise player 1 has no 
incentive to request for the file and do the 
transaction. Let’s also assume that when player 1 
plays (BT, i) he always choose a player -1 who is 
telling the truth. By these assumptions when player 1 
completes the transaction successfully he gains a 
utility of N-M and when the transaction fails it cost 
him –M.  
 
u1((BT, i ), s2,…..,sj+1) = N-M     
siא {T, L} ,  ׌ݏ௜=(T,G) ,  2൑ ݅ ൑ ݆ ൅ 1 
and 
u1((R, i), s2,…..,sj+1) = ൜
ܰ െ ܯ        ݂݅ s୧ ൌ T
െܯ               ݂݅ ݏ௜ ൌ ܮ 
        (3) 
 
For player -1 the utility function is the amount of 
increase or decrease of her reputation. 
 
u-1 ( (*, i), s2,… ,sj+1) = ൝
   ݑି௜ ൌ 1                                    
ݑ௜ ൌ ൜
1         ݂݅   ݏ௜ ൌ ܶ
െܭ    ݂݅  ݏ௜ ൌ ܮ
  
  2൑ ݅ ൑ ݆ ൅ 1                (4) 
 
Here by –i we means all the players that were not 
chosen by player 1. If a player is not chosen by 
player 1 she will gain a reward of 1 unit, as we say in 
definition 4-1. For the player i who is chosen, the 
utility depends on the strategy she select. If she lied it 
costs her –K units. 
The utility functions in 4-3 and 4-4 show the 
utility of players for a single round of the game. But 
this game is continuously played by players as long 
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as they participate in the P2P network. Each round of 
the game is equivalent to a 
request/answer/transaction in P2P file sharing 
network. For player -1 the utility is aggregated as the 
trust value of that player and each player ultimate 
goal is to boost her trust to a level which other peers 
agree to serve her. So for player -1 we consider the 
average utility to draw the game matrix. 
If player -1 has ଵ
௡
  of all files and choose to play the T 
(telling the truth) her payoff will be ଵ
௡
 in each round 
of game (zero for n-1 rounds and 1 for one round). If 
player -1 choose to lie and player 1 plays (BT, i) she 
gain 1 point, but if player 1 play (R, i) she will be 
selected by a probability of ଵ
௝
 and loose –K points. So 
the expected value for player -1 when she plays the L 
is: 
 
ui ((R, i), si, s-i) = 
ଵ
௝
*(-K) + ௝ିଵ
௝
*1 = ି௄ା௝ିଵ
௝
 = Z 
si = L              (5) 
 
With the above considerations in mind the game 
matrix is as figure 4-1. 
If we eliminate the weakly dominated strategies in 
the above game the expected outcome of this game 
will be 4-6 which is the worst outcome. 
 
((BT, i), si) ,   si = L  , 2 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݆ ൅ 1          (6) 
 
 2 … j+1 
T L  T L 
(BT, i) 1/n 
N-M 
1 
N-M 
 1/n 
N-M 
1 
N-M 
(R, i) 1/n 
N-M 
Z 
-M 
 1/n 
N-M 
Z 
-M 
N, M, K  > 0  2൑ ݅ ൑ ݆ ൅ 1 
Figure 4-1 the game matrix 
 
The profile which we want to be the result of 
elimination of dominated strategies is (7). 
 
( *, si) ,  si = T,   , 2 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݆ ൅ 1           (7) 
 
In the pure strategy space there is no way to  
dominate L by T because 1 > ଵ
௡
 , but if player 1 
choose a mixed strategy then by choosing an 
appropriate value for K we can make L dominated by 
T. Notice that K is the only quantity which its value 
is independent, so we can choose it as we wish. In (8) 
we calculate the value of K. Here we suppose player 
1 use the mixed strategy σଵ= (p, 1- p). 
 
u୧ሺσଵ, Tሻ  ൐  u୧ሺσଵ, Lሻ , i = {2,3…,j+1}  , 
σ1= (p, (1-p)) 
p כ ଵ
௡
൅ ሺ1 െ pሻ כ ଵ
௡
  ൐  ݌ כ 1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻሺି௄ା௝ିଵ
௝
ሻ                        
     
K ൐ ܬ െ 1 െ ௝ሺଵି௡௣ሻ
௡ሺଵି௣ሻ
                      (8) 
 
By setting K to this amount, L becomes the 
dominated strategy for player -1. In this way even 
when player 1 choose (R,i) he will select a non-liar 
and good server  peer. 
 
A. A discussion on the utility of player -1 
The goal of each peer in joining a P2P file sharing 
network is to receive files from others. To confront 
free riders we set a threshold for trust value of peers 
and after passing the threshold others serve to the 
peer. So in the game mentioned above the goal of 
player -1 is to boost her trust value to the threshold. 
And because the trust of each peer is the summation 
of points she gains in all the previous round of the 
game the aggregation function for player -1 when she 
choose the T in all rounds is as (9). 
 
∑ ଵ
௡
ఈ
௜ୀଵ        (9) 
 
If she chooses L, the aggregation function will be as 
(10) 
. 
∑ ݌ כ 1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻሺି௄ା௝ିଵ
௝
ሻఉ௜ୀଵ           (10)  
 
As we calculate in (8) the terms of (10) series is less 
then (9) terms so the (9) series pass the threshold 
sooner than (10). If the goal of player -1 is just to 
reach the threshold, by the K that was calculated in 
(8) it’s just took longer to reach the goal if she plays 
L.  
By making the (10) a descending series the player -1 
never reaches the threshold if she plays L. To make 
(10) a descending series we choose K in such a way 
that make the terms negative. 
 
݌ כ 1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ൬
െܭ ൅ ݆ െ 1
݆ ൰ ൏  0 
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K > ଵି ௝ି௣
௣ିଵ
                   (11) 
 
By this K if player -1 plays L she will never reach the 
threshold.  
 
B. choosing the threshold 
The goal of peers in a P2P file sharing network is 
to receive files from others. In order to confront free 
riding peers should gain a minimum trust value 
before others share their files with them. The higher 
this minimum amount is the longer it takes for a 
newcomer to receive services from others. In the 
other hand a very low amount for minimum trust 
makes layers undetectable. Here we try to choose the 
lowest acceptable amount for the threshold. 
If player 1 plays (R,i) with a 1-p probability there 
is a ଵ
௝
 chance for each player -1 to be selected. So 
there is a chance of ଵି௣
௝
 for player -1 to loose if she 
lied and with the probability of   ௝ା௣ିଵ 
௝
 she’ll gain 1 
point. Let for player -1, W denotes playing L and 
receiving 1 point and D denotes playing L and 
receiving -K points. The maximum profit player -1 
can gain in t rounds is t points if she receives 1 point 
in all t rounds continuously and in round t+1 receives 
-K points. The threshold should be t+1, so the 
probability of player -1 reaches it by playing L is as 
(12). This is the probability of the sequence: 
W1W2…WtD. 
 
ሺ௝ା௣ିଵ 
௝
ሻ௧        (12) 
 
In this work we didn’t study the value of t 
extensively.  
 
V. Simulation Results 
For simulation we use a Gnutella like simulator 
with 46000 peers. The peers are in three categories: 
good servers who tell the truth about having files and 
if are chosen serve well. Bad servers who tell the 
truth but if are chosen serve badly and liars who 
always answer queries. The parameters p, n and j 
from formulas are chosen to be 0.9, 100 and 30, 
respectively. To simulate the whitewashing 
phenomenon, the trust value of peers never fall below 
zero (the initial trust value). In simulation we 
consider all the peers stay connected to the network 
until the end. The average trust values of all three 
kinds of peers plus newcomers who provide good 
service are shown in figure 1. To simulate the worst 
case we consider the maximum trust value for liars 
and bad serviced providers and minimum trust value 
for good service providers.  The figure shows that the 
average trust value of good servers (newcomer or 
not) are increase monotonously and average trust 
value of bad servers and liars converge to 90 and 50. 
Although we choose K in (11) in such a way that 
makes the trust value negative it has a positive value 
in figure 1, that’s because of the whitewashing.  The 
trust value of good servers reaches 50 and 90 in 450 
and 770 cycles respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average trust value of  peers 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Cold start makes it impossible to use trust to solve 
two of the most important problems in P2P 
networking, server selection and free riding, 
simultaneously. We use game theory to model the 
behavior of peers and developed a mechanism in 
which free riding and providing bad service are 
dominated strategies for peers. The peer who wants 
to select a server among those who answered to her 
query does it randomly sometimes.  The simulation 
results showed that the trust value of peers who 
provide bad service or lie converges to less than 90 
and if peers don’t lie and provide good service their 
trust value surpass this value after less than 770 
cycles since the time they’ve joined the network. 
According to the results the trust value of good peers 
is independent of the time they join the network. 
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